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THE ROBERT L. LEVINE
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
INCOME DISPARITY, GENDER EQUALITY,
AND FREE EXPRESSION
Sylvia A. Law*
INTRODUCTION
In the past half century, our world has experienced a radical change
comparable to the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. At least
five elements are key: growing disparity of human opportunity, advance of
formal human rights and equality, information transformation, economic
globalization, and climate change. My focus is on economic disparity and
gender equality in the United States. These two issues, huge in and of
themselves, interact with the other cataclysmic changes of our time.
I came to law teaching in the early 1970s from civil rights work with poor
people. For many years, I taught first-year Torts. Ben Zipursky,1 organizer
of this conference and now a Torts professor himself, was one of many
fabulous students. At the end of each semester, I offered some thoughts on
the meaning of life in the law:
One fact, more than any other, influences the personal and professional
choices facing lawyers and law students today and the collective choices
that we face as a society. It is that we live in a world in which there are
gross disparities in the distribution of money, political power, and personal
opportunity for significant life choices.2

* Professor Emerita, NYU School of Law. I am grateful to many knowledgeable people who
shared ideas on this talk and paper. The errors or misjudgments are my own. Thanks to Arthur
Garfield Hays Fellows Seminar, Deborah Ellis, Chai Feldblum, Janice Goodman, Helen
Hershkoff, Nan Hunter, Evelyn Murphy, and Stephanie Wildman. I am most especially
grateful to my magnificent research assistant, Carmen Tellez, NYU Law 2019, and my faculty
assistant, Kellene O’Hara. These remarks were delivered in conjunction with the Symposium
entitled Gender Equality and the First Amendment, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on
November 1–2, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the
Symposium, see Jeanmarie Fenrich, Benjamin C. Zipursky & Danielle Keats Citron,
Foreword: Gender Equality and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2019).
1. Benjamin C. Zipursky, James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham Law
School, and organizer of this Symposium.
2. Sylvia A. Law, The Messages of Legal Education, in LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL 155,
155–56 (Stephen Gilles ed., 1977).
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I bemoaned the fact that the top fifth of the population receives 40 percent of
income, while the bottom fifth only 5 percent.3 While the situation was
infinitely worse for those at the bottom, even those who made it to the top
were not secure because life is unpredictable.
These disparities were profoundly disturbing in 1973. Today, the years
from the end of World War II into the mid-1970s are remembered as a period
of economic equality, substantial growth, and broadly shared prosperity.4
Incomes grew rapidly and at similar rates across the income ladder, roughly
doubling in inflation-adjusted dollars.5 The income gap between highincome people and those on the middle and lower rungs did not change
much.6 In 1973, the average CEO earned 22.3 times as much as the average
worker.7 By 2013, the average CEO earned 295.9 times as much as the
average worker.8 During that period, the maximum marginal tax rate on
individual income fell from 70 percent to 37 percent.9 What happened?
I. GROWING INCOME INEQUALITY
Beginning in the mid-1970s, economic growth slowed and the income gap
widened. Income growth for middle- and lower-income households slowed
sharply, while incomes at the top grew fast. The concentration of income at
the very top rose to unprecedented levels not seen since the Gilded Age of
the Roaring Twenties.10 By 2015, the top 1 percent of households earned
one-fifth of the nation’s income; wealth inequality is even greater with the
top 1 percent owning approximately 38 percent of the nation’s wealth.11
Today, the much publicized good news is that, in 2017, the median U.S.
household income rose for a third straight year, by 1.8 percent to $61,372,12

3. Id. at 156.
4. See CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS
ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY 1 (2018).
5. Id.
6. See id. See generally MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA
(2013).
7. LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA DAVIS, ECON. POL’Y INST., CEO PAY CONTINUES TO
RISE AS TYPICAL WORKERS ARE PAID LESS 3–7 (2014).
8. Id.
9. Robert H. Frank, How Rising Income Inequality Threatens Access to the Legal System,
148 DAEDALUS 10, 14 (2019).
10. Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
1, 7 (2016).
11. Id. at 3. In 2015, the top 1 percent received 17 percent of the nation’s income before
federal taxes and transfers and 13 percent after. STONE ET AL., supra note 4, at 13. The Federal
Reserve estimates that in 2016 the top 1 percent of the population owned 38.6 percent of the
nation’s wealth. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 1, 10
(“The wealth share of the top 1 percent climbed from 36.3 percent in 2013 to 38.6 percent in
2016, slightly surpassing the wealth share of the next highest 9 percent of families
combined.”).
12. KAYLA FONTENOT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2017, at 4 (2018).
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the highest on record since 1967.13 The reassuring news about rising income
is distorted in many ways. First, it does not take into account even sharper
increases in the costs of basic life essentials, particularly the costs of housing.
In the past twenty years, the prices for daily goods—food, housing,
transportation, and education—have increased faster than inflation, giving
the dollar less buying power.14 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) maintained
by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics measures the average price change
over time of all consumer products purchased in urban areas, where
approximately 90 percent of the U.S. population lives.15 For example, as of
July 2018, basic consumer products that would have cost $20 in 1998 would
now cost $31.16
Consider the costs of housing. In the twenty-first century, the costs of
housing have risen faster than incomes, at over double the speed of wages.17
Home prices are up 6.1 percent annually, while wages are increasing 2.4
percent a year.18 Rental cost increases are similar. In 2015, the CPI for rent
of a primary residence increased 3.5 percent annually, outpacing the overall
index’s rates.19 In 2018, rental costs increased an average of 3.7 percent,
while wages for that same time period only rose 2.7 percent.20 The “housing
wage” describes the relationship between income and housing costs.21 What
full-time hourly wage does a person need to earn to rent a modest onebedroom apartment? Nationally, the 2017 housing wage was $21.21, which
is 2.9 times the federal minimum wage.22 The statistics are even bleaker in
13. Id. (“With this adjustment, the 2017 real median household income is not statistically
different from the estimates in any year between 1998 and 2001 or 2005 through 2007, but is
higher than all other years since 1967.”).
14. How Does the Current Cost of Living Compare to 20 Years Ago?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb.
10, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101314/what-does-current-cost-livingcompare-20-years-ago.asp [https://perma.cc/9EUA-Q9S3].
15. Will Kenton, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cpiu.asp [https://perma.cc/G7VT8YY7].
16. How Does the Current Cost of Living Compare to 20 Years Ago?, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., Mitchell Hartman, Home Prices Rise Much Faster Than Wages and
Consumer Prices, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 28, 2017, 6:55 AM), https://www.marketplace.org/
2017/11/28/economy/home-prices-rise-much-faster-wages-and-consumer-prices
[https://perma.cc/G5Y4-MPTM].
18. See id.; see also Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, The S&P CoreLogic CaseSchiller National Home Price NSA Index Reaches New High as Momentum Continues (Oct.
31,
2017),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-sp-corelogic-case-shillernational-home-price-nsa-index-reaches-new-high-as-momentum-continues-300546378.html
[https://perma.cc/UU5P-M7J8].
19. Jeffrey Sparshott, Rising Rents Outpace Wages in Wide Swaths of the U.S., WALL
ST. J. (July 28, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-rents-outpace-wages-in-wideswaths-of-the-u-s-1438117026 [https://perma.cc/2VZV-YQU4].
20. Andrea Riquier, Rents Are Still Growing Much Faster Than Wages, Even as Growth
Cools Slightly, MARKETWATCH (June 13, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/rentsare-still-growing-much-faster-than-wages-even-as-growth-cools-slightly-2018-06-12
[https://perma.cc/ELA2-9UP9].
21. ANDREW AURAND ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2017: THE
HIGH COST OF HOUSING 1 (2017).
22. Id.
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localities with low housing stock, rising rent prices, or stagnant wages.23
While housing in the private market becomes more costly, federal support
for housing for low-income people, through Section 8 vouchers24 or public
housing,25 has fallen sharply.
Good news about modestly rising income is also misleading because the
private costs of education have increased exponentially. In 2016, the average
cost of a four-year college education was $104,480, while the comparable
cost for a four-year degree in 1989 was $26,902 ($52,892 adjusted for
inflation).26 The burden of student loans is now a bigger share of consumer
debt than either credit cards or auto loans.27 The quality of primary and
secondary education in the United States has fallen, even as a growing global
economy makes education more essential.28 Caring parents scramble to
educate their children, but most lack the income to supplement inadequate
public schools or to relocate to neighborhoods where schools are better. In
addition to failing to account for the rising costs of essential services, general
data on rising income ignores disparities based on gender, race, and other
factors. In 2017, the median annual earnings in the United States for women
and men working full-time and year-round were $41,977 and $52,146,

23. For example, in San Francisco, a person needs to earn $179,529 to rent the average
available apartment, while in Phoenix the figure is only $41,057 and in Detroit, $46,586.
Derek Miller, The Income Needed to Pay Rent in the Largest U.S. Cities—2017 Edition,
SMARTASSET (Sept. 20, 2018), https://smartasset.com/mortgage/the-income-needed-to-payrent-2017-edition [https://perma.cc/YLF7-KT7E].
24. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is authorized to
provide housing assistance, including housing choice vouchers, under section 8 of the U.S.
Housing Act of 1937. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING
PROGRAMS: HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 1 (2014).
The Trump administration has proposed cuts to HUD’s Section 8 programs. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CONGRESS SHOULD INCREASE HUD
FUNDING IN 2019 TO PREVENT VOUCHER CUTS, HELP CHILDREN ESCAPE POVERTY 2 (2018);
Glenn Thrush, As Affordable Housing Crisis Grows, HUD Sits on the Sidelines, N.Y. TIMES
(July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/us/politics/hud-affordable-housingcrisis.html [https://perma.cc/BM37-E6D4].
25. In the past two decades, the number of public housing units fell by 250,000, while
need increased. Public Housing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 2 (Nov. 15, 2017),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-housing.pdf [http://perma.cc/
BP43-QHAF].
26. Camilo Maldonado, Price of College Increasing Almost 8 Times Faster Than Wages,
FORBES (July 24, 2018, 8:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/camilomaldonado/2018/07/
24/price-of-college-increasing-almost-8-times-faster-than-wages/ [https://perma.cc/A5PWMGR2].
27. Id.
28. See Drew DeSilver, U.S. Students’ Academic Achievement Still Lags That of Their
Peers in Many Other Countries, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/15/u-s-students-internationally-math-science
[https://perma.cc/3QJ4-9LJ3]. In 2015, the Programme for International Student Assessment
tested fifteen-year-olds in seventy-one developed and developing countries and placed the
United States thirty-eighth in math and twenty-forth in science and literacy. Id. Among the
thirty-five members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
United States ranked thirtieth in math and ninetieth in science. Id.

2019]

INCOME DISPARITY AND GENDER EQUALITY

2483

respectively, a gender pay gap of 20 percent.29 The gap compounds over a
lifetime, follows women into retirement, and impacts Social Security and
pensions.30
The racial pay gap is even greater than the gender gap. In 2015, black
men’s average hourly wages were 31 percent lower than all men’s.31 More
disturbingly, except for a brief narrowing in the late 1990s, the racial pay gap
between black and white workers has remained stable or increased for nearly
forty years.32 In 2017, while median household income for white, nonHispanic households rose 2.6 percent to $68,145, it fell 0.2 percent to
$40,258 for African American households.33
While the Fordham celebration and this paper focus on women, that
category includes women of many colors, ethnicities, religions, sexual
identities and orientations, classes, nationalities, ages, and more. Each of
these categories is consequential and deserves its own careful examination.
Use of the category “woman” hides complexity and, more insidiously, could
reduce “woman” to white women of relative privilege.34 At the same time,
“‘[c]ognitively, we need simplifying categories, and the unifying category of
“woman” helps to organize experience, even at the cost of denying some of
it.’ Abandoning mental categories completely would leave us . . . terrorized
by the sheer weight and particularity of experience.”35
II. FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING GENDER PAY DISCRIMINATION AND
THE REMEDIES TO ENFORCE THEM ARE WEAK
Before examining the detail of the cultural and legal commitment to equal
pay for equal work, consider the experiences of two women who eventually
won claims for equal pay.
Lilly Ledbetter was a supervisor at a Goodyear tire plant in Alabama for
nineteen years, from 1979 to 1998, when she received an anonymous note
informing her that her less experienced male colleagues earned a lot more.36
Her pay was initially in line with her coworkers, but by 1997, Ledbetter was
the only woman working as an area manager and the pay discrepancy

29. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP:
FALL 2018 EDITION 7 (2018).
30. Id. at 5.
31. VALERIE WILSON & WILLIAM M. RODGERS III, ECON. POL’Y INST., BLACK-WHITE
WAGE GAPS EXPAND WITH RISING WAGE INEQUALITY 1, 3 (2016).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Katanga Johnson, U.S. Incomes Rose but Inequality Widened in 2017:
Data, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economypoverty/u-s-incomes-rose-but-inequality-widened-in-2017-data-idUSKCN1LS2HX
[https://perma.cc/Y3HU-UQXA].
34. For a classic statement of the issues, see generally Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
35. Id. at 607 (quoting Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 47, 51 (1988)).
36. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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between her and her fifteen male counterparts was stark.37 She was paid
$3727 per month; the lowest-paid male area manager received $4286 per
month, and the highest-paid man in the same position was paid $5236.38 She
sued under federal law, and in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision
held that the 180-day statute of limitations barred her from claiming relief for
decades of discrimination.39 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting for four, would
have held that the discrimination was ongoing and cumulative.40 Congress,
following Ginsburg’s advice, passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009.41 The vote was along party lines, except for five Republican senators,
including four Republican women Senators, who supported Ledbetter.42 On
January 29, 2009, it was the first bill that newly elected President Obama
signed into law.43
A second woman, Carrie Gracie, grew up in Scotland, graduated from
Oxford University, and began work at the BBC in 1987.44 Four years later,
she became the BBC World Service’s correspondent in China, threw herself
into Chinese life, became fluent, married a Chinese musician, and had two
children.45 In 1997, the BBC promoted her to Beijing bureau chief.46 She
was the main breadwinner of the family.47 When Gracie’s daughter
developed leukemia, they returned to England for medical care.48 Gracie
worked at the BBC as an anchorperson and continued to cover China from
abroad, producing a Peabody Award–winning documentary on the
transformation of a rural community.49 In 2013, the BBC offered her the
position as chief China editor.50 Her children were teenagers settled in
England, but she loved the work.51 She sought and got assurance that her
pay would be equal to colleagues in equivalent posts in other parts of the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 621 (majority opinion).
40. Id. at 647–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
42. S. 181 (111th):
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s14 [https://perma.cc/8XKT-76JJ] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2019).
43. Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 1 PUB. PAPERS 22 (Jan.
29, 2009).
44. See Jane Martinson, Carrie Gracie: Fearless Leader of Battle for Equal Pay at the
BBC, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/14/carriegracie-fearless-leader-of-battle-for-equal-pay-at-bbc [https://perma.cc/Y23H-X5BS]; see
also Ben Dowell, Carrie Gracie Profile: Award-Winning Journalist with Years at World
Service, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/may/12/
carrie-gracie-bbc-news-salary-profile [https://perma.cc/867K-4EF5].
45. Lauren Collins, How the BBC Women Are Working Toward Equal Pay, NEW YORKER
(July 23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/23/how-the-bbc-women-areworking-toward-equal-pay [https://perma.cc/YBQ3-CEDY].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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world.52 In 2017, the British government required the publicly funded BBC
to publish a list of high earners.53 The two male chief foreign editors were
on the list.54 Gracie and the other woman chief foreign editor were not.55
The women earned 50 percent less than their male colleagues.56 Gracie
protested by saying that she was not asking to be paid more, only to be paid
equally.57 After months of wrangling, the BBC apologized and paid her back
wages, which she donated to the Fawcett Society, a British women’s rights
organization providing legal advice and strategic support for women seeking
equal pay.58
Violations of legal and cultural equal pay norms are common. A culture
of pay secrecy often makes it impossible to know whether there is a violation.
The money matters, especially for the majority who struggle financially. But
it is not only about the money. As Carrie Gracie put it, she felt as though her
male bosses had a naked picture of her in their office and laughed every time
they saw it, saying: “It is the humiliation and shame of feeling that they
regarded you as second class.”59 Pay secrecy is not the only problem. Even
with information, there are other obstacles, both substantive and procedural,
to redress violations of equal pay norms.
Civil rights advocates have traditionally looked to federal laws and courts
to enforce equality norms. This Part briefly examines the federal laws
bearing on pay equality and the remedies available to enforce those laws. It
finds them seriously deficient. Further, for the foreseeable future, the most
that advocates for civil rights and equality can expect from federal courts is
adherence to established precedent and enforcement of clearly articulated
federal laws. That is not nothing, but more is needed and possible paths
forward are explored in Part III.
Since 1963, a year before the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal
Equal Pay Act has made it illegal to pay men and women different wages for
equal work.60 The core liberal principle of equal pay for women and men
who do equal work commands broad public support, even among those who
reject feminism and women’s liberation.61 In 1964, Congress prohibited
discrimination in voting, public accommodations, education, and
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Amie Tsang, BBC Apologizes to Carrie Gracie, Former China Editor, over Unequal
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/business/media/bbcgender-pay-carrie-gracie.html [https://perma.cc/XV7W-HA4B].
59. Collins, supra note 45.
60. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(2012)).
61. See Most Americans Support Equal Pay for Men and Women, RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr.
13, 2018), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/jobs_employment/
april_2018/most_americans_support_equal_pay_for_men_and_women
[http://perma.cc/
82LW-TURS] (finding in a nationwide survey that 67 percent of adults support a California
law requiring equal pay for men and women for substantially similar work).
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employment on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, as well
as discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.62 The 1964 Civil Rights
Act was a response to the massive movement for basic civil rights for the
African American descendants of those brought to the United States as
slaves.63 Title VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act, both in terms of groups
covered and forms of discrimination prohibited.64
When the Equal Pay Act was adopted in 1963, women earned 59 cents on
the male dollar,65 and today they earn 80 cents.66 But that ratio has been
stalled for almost thirty years.67 Factors, other than the federal equal pay
law, contribute to the reduction of the gender pay gap; most importantly,
changes in higher education. Between 1970 and 2010, the proportion of
women undergraduates rose from 42 percent to 57 percent, while the
proportion of women graduate students grew from 35 percent to 59 percent,
and the proportion of women in medicine, law, and business shot up from
9 percent to 47 percent.68 Women are now more educated than men, but they
still earn less.69 Why does the disparity persist? Three factors seem most
important. First, work is segregated by gender.70 To put it simply, men are
more likely to be plumbers and women, nurses and teachers.71 Traditional
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
63. The prohibition on sex discrimination was included at a late stage. People dispute
whether it was a segregationist effort to defeat the bill with the “ridiculous” idea that women
should be treated equally under the law or an astute move by politically unified feminists. See,
e.g., Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1014–20
(2015). Schultz documents the standard popular and scholarly story that the addition of “sex”
was a conservative Southern effort to defeat the bill and offers an alternative story that the
National Women’s Party, and lawyer-activist Pauli Murray, organized to push for a narrow,
but important, version of equality for working women. Id. The effort was helped by the 1963
publication of Betty Friedan’s best-selling book, The Feminine Mystique. Id. at 1017.
64. Since 1979, the enforcement of the Equal Pay Act rests with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, as well as
the Department of Justice and Department of Labor. See Civil Rights Center (CRC), U.S.
DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/crc/about-crc.htm [https://perma.cc/KLZ78AMR] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes [https://perma.cc/W889-5DEZ] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2019); Laws Enforced by the Employment Litigation Section, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/laws-enforced-employment-litigation-section [https://perma.cc/
M5EL-M395] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
65. About NCPE, NAT’L COMMISSION ON PAY EQUITY, https://www.payequity.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/G7LR-FZBN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
66. JASMINE TUCKER, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN EXPERIENCE A WAGE GAP IN
NEARLY EVERY OCCUPATION 1 (2018).
67. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 29, at 5.
68. Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting Institutions, by Level of Degree and Sex of
Student: Selected Years, 1869–70 Through 2020–21, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_283.asp [https://perma.cc/UN8B-7M2C]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
69. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, Millennial Women Are More Educated Than Men, but Are
Still Paid Less, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 11, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/millennial-women-are-more-educated-than-men-but-are-still-paid-less-2015-04-08
[https://perma.cc/T5YN-FDY6].
70. Id.
71. Id.
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male jobs pay more.72 Second, women take greater responsibility for
childcare and are assumed to be less valuable as workers. This raises
complex issues. But, “42 percent of mothers with children under the age of
18 are their families’ primary or sole breadwinners.”73 Assumptions that
men deserve more because they are the primary or sole family support no
longer describe the way we live. Even women without children experience
gender pay disparity.74 The third explanation for the gender wage disparity
is discrimination, and that has long been illegal.
Substantively, the U.S. federal requirements for gender-based wage
equality are weak under both the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act.
Most courts have interpreted both statutes to require a wage comparison
between a man and a woman doing near-identical work.75 Finding a
comparable employee who meets the requirement for “equal work” is further
complicated by changes to workplaces resulting from the new economy.
“[I]n today’s workplaces, routine duties have become increasingly
mechanized or outsourced, with the remaining employees performing varied
and discretionary tasks.”76 As fewer people perform identical tasks in a
particular workplace, it is more difficult to identify an identical male
counterpart.
Even if a woman identifies a man in the same establishment who does
identical work and is paid more, the federal law allows the employer to show
that the pay difference for near-identical work is supported by a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason”77 or by any “factor other than sex.”78 Judicial
interpretation of these defenses has given employers wide latitude to “derail
equal pay claims by allowing any facially neutral factor to justify paying
women less than men for performing equal work.”79
In the 1980s, the stubborn persistence of the gender pay gap and the
perceived weakness of federal equal pay standards led many feminists, and
some unions and states, to advocate a broader concept of pay equity.
“Comparable worth” builds on the observation that work in the United States
is highly sex-segregated, and the work typically done by women is paid less
than work done by men.80 Under comparable worth theory, “sex-based wage

72. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 29, at 14.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage
Disclosure Laws—a Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 385, 400 (2013).
75. Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 609 (2018).
76. Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing
Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 474 (2018).
77. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(4) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012); Deborah L.
Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness: Why and How the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense
Matters, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 889, 890–91 (2016).
79. Brake, supra note 78, at 891.
80. See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 75, at 615–19; Nancy Levit & Joan Mahoney, The
Future of Comparable Worth Theory, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 99, 100 (1984). See generally Paul
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discrimination exists if employees in job classifications occupied primarily
by women are paid less than employees in job classifications filled primarily
by men, if the jobs are of equal value to the employer, though otherwise
dissimilar.”81 Employers would be required to pay equal wages for different
jobs that are comparable in value but filled predominantly by women and
men, respectively. But the question of equal value is obviously complex and
deeply gendered.
Advocates of comparable worth claims recognized that the Equal Pay Act
was not helpful, so they argued that Title VII’s broader language prohibiting
pay discrimination “on the basis of sex” supported such claims. During the
Carter administration, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) Chair, Eleanor Holmes Norton, supported the concept.82 Ronald
Reagan appointed Clarence Thomas as EEOC Chair and he, of course,
rejected the idea.83 Elections matter.
In 1981 in County of Washington v. Gunther,84 the U.S. Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, held that Title VII’s prohibitions against sex discrimination
in pay could be read more broadly than those in the Equal Pay Act.85 The
county paid male prison guards more than female prison guards.86
Recognizing that the work demanded was not identical, the county hired
consultants to advise it whether the pay disparities were justified by
differences in the nature of the work.87 The experts recommended that the
women guards be paid 90 percent of the male wage.88 The county rejected
the recommendation and offered the women 70 percent.89 The issue before
the Court was whether Title VII prohibited a broader range of pay equality
claims than that allowed by the Equal Pay Act.90 Justice William J. Brennan,
writing for the majority, found that “the failure of the county to pay [the
female guards] the full evaluated worth of their jobs can be proven to be
attributable to intentional sex discrimination.”91 In his dissent, Justice
William Rehnquist protested that the majority opened the door to
“comparable worth” claims under Title VII.92 Even Brennan, for the
majority, denied that it was adopting “the controversial concept of
‘comparable worth.’”93

Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1728 (1986).
81. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.
1985) (emphasis added).
82. Weiler, supra note 80, at 1728.
83. Id. at 1729.
84. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
85. Id. at 178–79.
86. Id. at 163–64.
87. Id. at 180.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 181.
90. Id. at 168.
91. Id. at 181.
92. Id. at 183–84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 166 (majority opinion).
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The modest promise of Gunther was not realized. In a series of cases,
public sector unions persuaded states to conduct studies to determine whether
men and women were paid equally for work that was comparable in terms of
education, training, skill, effort, responsibility, value to employers, and other
factors.94 When the studies demonstrated that jobs dominated by women
systematically paid less than comparable jobs dominated by men, and states
refused to make the recommended pay adjustments, women sought relief in
federal courts under Title VII.95 These claims were rejected.96 The courts
relied on a “market defense” and held that, even where the employer
conducted a pay equity study that exposed disparities by gender, setting pay
using “prevailing market rates” did not constitute discrimination under Title
VII. Then–Ninth Circuit Judge Anthony Kennedy opined that “[n]either law
nor logic deems the free market system a suspect enterprise.”97 Seventh
Circuit Judge Richard Posner opined that “the issue of comparable worth . . .
is not of the sort that judges are well equipped to resolve intelligently or that
we should lightly assume has been given to us to resolve by Title VII or the
Constitution.”98
There are answers to these claims. “Prevailing market rates” developed
over centuries in which women and people of color were not recognized as
full citizens or people, and were relegated to separate, inferior spheres. Title
VII was part of a larger civil rights movement rejecting those assumptions.
Judges are paid to do hard work, interpreting and enforcing the law. As
conservative Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in a different context,
“Congress, as it frequently does, has voiced its wishes in muted strains and
left it to the courts to discern the theme in the cacophony of political
understanding.”99 Judges are expected to interpret and enforce complex
laws. Courts enforce the Sherman Act, even though the statute is far from
precise and the factual issues are dauntingly complex. The comparable worth
concept, now rejected under federal law, is explored further in Part III.
Procedural obstacles to the enforcement of pay equity norms are even more
problematic than the weak substantive federal pay equality rules.100 Under
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party to a civil claim is
entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law, if a complaint and answer
raise no disputed genuine issue of material fact and the law is clear.101 Since
the 1960s, there has been a steady and substantial increase in the rate of case
94. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1403
(9th Cir. 1985).
95. See generally Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); Am. Fed’n
of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 770 F.2d 1401; Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir. 1984).
96. See, e.g., Am. Nurses’ Ass’n, 783 F.2d at 730; Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps.,
770 F.2d at 1408; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 692.
97. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 770 F.2d at 1407.
98. Am. Nurses’ Ass’n, 783 F.2d at 720.
99. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970).
100. For an excellent overview of these issues, see generally Helen Hershkoff & Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Sex, Trump and Constitutional Change, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 43 (2019).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
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termination by summary judgment.102 Although summary judgment can be
granted in favor of either a plaintiff or a defendant, it is granted far more
often in favor of defendants, closing the courthouse door on the plaintiff’s
claims.103 Summary judgments are sought in all types of federal cases. But,
according to the Federal Judicial Center, summary judgment motions by
defendants are far more common in employment discrimination cases than
in other cases; 35 percent in employment cases as opposed to 10 percent in
contract claims and 11 percent in torts, for example.104 When defendants are
granted motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs are denied the ability to
take discovery and to present their claims to a jury.105 While the growing
use of summary judgment to bar plaintiffs’ claims is disturbing in many
contexts,106 it has a harshly disproportionate impact on gender equality
claims.107
Similarly, in 2009, the Court made it more difficult to sue in federal court
by requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims are “plausible”
rather than simply describing the case in sufficient detail to put the defendant
on notice.108 Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”109 If the judge finds the claim to be
“implausible,” it must be dismissed. In criticizing this decision, many have
observed “judicial experience and common sense” has often been deaf, blind,
and worse to the experience of women.110
Other seemingly neutral technical “procedural” decisions have made it
more difficult for women to challenge discriminatory workplace practices.
For example, in 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,111 the Court, in a
5-4 decision, dramatically restricted the ability to bring antidiscrimination
102. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591,
592–93 (2004).
103. Id. at 616.
104. Memorandum from Joe Cecil and George Cort to Judge Michael Baylson, Fed.
Judicial Ctr. 12 tbl.7 (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/sujulrs2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q44U-PML7].
105. Id. at 15–17. Motions are granted in 20 percent of employment cases, 6 percent of
contracts cases, and 5 percent of torts claims. Id. at 16.
106. For example, under the federal law requiring hospitals to provide treatment to people
in emergencies, particularly women in active labor, hospitals typically move for and obtain
summary judgment even when the facts are contested. See Nathan S. Richards, Note, Judicial
Resolution of EMTALA Screening Claims at Summary Judgment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 593
(2012).
107. See, e.g., Hershkoff & Schneider, supra note 100, at 101–10.
108. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007); Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 744
(2016).
109. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
110. See Hershkoff & Schneider, supra note 100, at 91; Schultz, supra note 63, at 999
(“Advancing workplace equality has meant taking on common sense assumptions about who
‘women’ are, what they want, and what they should do (while implicitly disputing parallel
assumptions about men).”).
111. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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claims as a class.112 Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the United
States, employing more than one million people in over 3000 stores.113
Plaintiffs presented statistical data showing that women filled 65 percent of
the hourly jobs at Wal-Mart but only 33 percent of management positions.114
Affidavits from 121 prospective class members documented explicit gender
bias.115 Plaintiffs challenged company-wide policies giving its mostly male
managers broad discretion over pay and promotions.116 The trial court
certified a proposed class, finding evidence that the gender disparity resulted
from subjective the selection process117 combined with a centrally controlled
corporate culture and micromanagement that promoted gender
stereotypes.118 A panel of the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit en banc,
affirmed.119
The Court reversed in a 5-4 decision. Justice Antonin Scalia, for the
majority, found that a policy of subjective discretion is not a uniform
employment practice that provides the necessary commonality for class
certification.120 Justice Ginsburg dissented, observing that “[t]he risk of
discrimination is heightened when . . . managers are predominantly of one
sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates gender
stereotypes.”121 As Michele E. Gilman observes,
[E]xtensive research establishes that subjective, discretionary personnel
practices contribute to pay disparities.
Despite these modern
understandings of discrimination, Justice Scalia was wedded to oldfashioned notions that focus solely on the employer’s state of mind rather
than on how unconscious bias interacts with organizational structures to
allow unchecked stereotypes to determine employment outcomes.122

For yet another example of how the interpretation of seemingly neutral
procedural rules can undermine legislative and popular efforts to enforce
long-standing gender and racial pay equity norms and other workers’ rights,
consider the question of whether employers can demand that workers forfeit
rights to seek collective arbitration or class action remedies for shared
grievances. In recent years, employers increasingly demand, as a condition
of employment, that employees waive rights to sue for violation of federal or
state laws or contract terms and, rather, insist that employees rely on

112. See id. at 376 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 370 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 165 (N.D. Cal. 2004), rev’d, 564
U.S. 338 (2011).
116. Id. at 141–42.
117. Id. at 148–49.
118. Id. at 151–54.
119. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d,
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
120. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2001).
121. Id. at 373 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Gilman, supra note 10, at 29–30.
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individual arbitration.123 “Agreements” to arbitrate conflicts resulting from
employment are placed in the small print of a job application, a slip of paper
in a paycheck envelope, the employment handbook, or a severance
agreement. Mandatory arbitration clauses cover at least thirty million
employees.124 Such “contracts” often seem inconsistent with basic commonlaw rules prohibiting agreements so unfair as to be “unconscionable” or
contracts of “adhesion” in which a powerful party forces unfair terms on a
weaker party.125 Further, collective remedies, whether in courts or in
arbitration, are often the only effective means to effectuate rights where
individual claims are relatively small. If the value of the individual claim is
less than the costs of enforcement, claims will be heard only if brought in the
aggregate. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,126 the Court considered employee
claims of “wage theft”—that their employers underpaid them in violation of
the wage and hours prescriptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.127
Employers required workers to sign “agreements” waiving their rights to
seek collective judicial or arbitral remedies.128 Two federal laws speak to
the question.129 The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) allows disputes
related to contract agreements to be settled through arbitration outside the
judicial process.130 Second, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA) protects employees’ “right to self-organize” and to engage in
“concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.”131
Justice Gorsuch, for the majority, held that the FAA expressed a strong
“federal policy favoring arbitration” and that the NLRA’s protection of
“other concerted activities” did not include class litigation or arbitration.132
Justice Ginsburg, for four, protested that the FAA was intended to support
the ability of businesses to enter into informed agreements to arbitrate, not
this arm-twisting “take-it-or-leave-it” contract.133 Federal labor law protects

123. Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That
Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1125.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also Klos v. Pulski Linie Lotnicze,
133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d. Cir.1997) (“A contract of adhesion is a contract formed as a ‘product
of gross inequality of bargaining power’ between parties. A court will find adhesion only
when the party seeking to rescind the contract establishes that the other party used ‘high
pressure tactics,’ or ‘deceptive language,’ or that the contract is unconscionable.” (quoting
Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))).
126. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
127. Id. at 1619–20.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Arbitration agreements are valid except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
131. “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
132. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1621–32.
133. Id. at 1636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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collective action and does not countenance such isolation of employees.134
Justice Ginsburg observed that “[t]he inevitable result of today’s decision
will be the underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to
advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”135 Violations of minimumwage and overtime laws are widespread, and government agencies rely on
private parties to enforce them.136 She noted that Congress also relied on
private enforcement to assure compliance with federal civil rights laws and
suggested that “it would be grossly exorbitant to read the FAA to devastate
Title VII . . . and other laws enacted to eliminate, root and branch, classbased employment discrimination.”137 It remains unclear how the decision
might impact claims of gender and race discrimination otherwise prohibited
by Title VII.
As Justice Ginsburg did in her dissent from the majority’s decision to deny
Lilly Ledbetter the right to sue for decades of illegal pay discrimination, she
called on Congress to act:
[T]he edict that employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only
one-by-one does not come from Congress. It is the result of take-it-orleave-it labor contracts and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those
unbargained-for agreements. The FAA demands no such suppression of
the right of workers to take concerted action for their “mutual aid or
protection.”138

Labor unions,139 newspapers,140 and others141 have taken up the call.
III. SOME PATHS FORWARD TO CLOSING DISCRIMINATORY
INCOME GAPS
Since the Civil War, advocates for civil rights and equality have looked
first to the federal government for redress. Since the 2016 election, and for
the foreseeable future, the most that can be expected of the federal courts is
adherence to established precedent and enforcement of rules clearly
articulated by Congress. Advocates for civil rights and equality, and those

134. Id. at 1633–35.
135. Id. at 1646 (citing J. R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers
Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protections, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 1309 (2015)).
136. Id. at 1647 (“[The] Department of Labor investigates fewer than 1 percent of FLSAcovered employers each year.” (citing J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1150–51 (2012)).
137. Id. at 1648.
138. Id. at 1648–49.
139. Daniel Hemel, The Arbitration Fight Isn’t Over, SLATE (May 22, 2018, 3:30 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/the-epic-systems-v-lewis-mandatory-arbitrationruling-was-awful-heres-how-states-can-counteract-it.html [https://perma.cc/59XN-S3KY].
140. See, e.g., Editorial, After Supreme Court Decision, Congress Must Preserve Workers’
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/
editorials/la-ed-supreme-court-workplace-lawsuit-labor-20180521-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U4JS-F3JN].
141. The Restoring Justice for Workers Act would do just that. See generally Restoring
Justice for Workers Act, S. 3615, 115th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Nov. 14, 2018).
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who teach them, need to learn dramatic new ways of thinking and action,
including organizing, state and local lawmaking, and leadership by
progressive private enterprises. This Part suggests paths forward, relying on
transparency and collective action on individual, workplace, community,
local, and state levels. Recognizing that the United States has lagged far
behind other developed countries in addressing discriminatory economic
disparity, this Part looks to other models to identify what is feasible and the
large positive impact of greater economic equality on overall productivity
and well-being. The information revolution, while creating huge challenges,
facilitates transparency and collective action at every level from the personal
to the global.
Every story of a successful challenge to the gender wage gap begins with
a woman discovering that she is earning less than a male colleague who does
similar, or less demanding, work. There is a strong social norm against
discussing wages.142 A common explanation is that it is a matter of
etiquette.143 Disclosing high pay can be seen as bragging, while disclosing
low pay may feel embarrassing, as though it is revealing something about
one’s worth.144 Pay secrecy may be an aspect of America’s social and
cultural values regarding privacy.145 While it seems plain that there has been
a social taboo against revealing wages and wealth, the reasons for it are far
from obvious. Further, it seems that younger generations are less likely to
share the norm against discussing wages,146 in part because the internet
accustoms people to sharing large swaths of data.147
Far more important than uncertain and perhaps changing social norms,
workers do not discuss their pay because they believe that they are prohibited
142. See, e.g., Nadira A. Hira, Your Salary: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell?, FORTUNE (Apr. 30,
2008), http://fortune.com/2008/04/30/your-salary-dont-ask-dont-tell [https://perma.cc/AL93DWD2]; Jena McGregor, Why Is It Still So Taboo to Talk About What We Make?, WASH. POST
(May 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/05/05/why-isit-still-so-taboo-to-talk-about-what-we-make/ [https://perma.cc/5RPL-U9BD]; Lisa Roolant,
How People from Different Countries Feel About Discussing Salary, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 11,
2014, 10:48 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/discussing-salary-around-the-world2014-3 [https://perma.cc/X92U-7YRR].
143. Sarah Lyons, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt Pay-Secrecy Norms:
Analyzing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social Norms, 46 COLUM. J.L.
SOC. PROBS. 361, 381 (2013) (referring to Professor Ed Lawler describing this as a middleclass phenomenon).
144. Id.; Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1068
(2012).
145. Adrienne Colella et al., Exposing Pay Secrecy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 55, 62 (2007);
Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay,
4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 797 (2014).
146. Chris Weller, Millenials Are Breaking the One Big Salary Taboo—and It’s Changing
How Companies Operate, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 25, 2017, 2:19 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/salary-not-taboo-for-millennials-changing-howbusinesses-work-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/JE88-5TDG]; cf. Arianna Davis, The Real
Reasons Millennial Women Don’t Talk About Their Salaries, REFINERY29 (Apr. 10, 2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.refinery29.com/2018/04/195951/real-women-salary-secrecycompetition [https://perma.cc/CFM8-ZLSZ].
147. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 958 & n.24 (2011).
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from doing so. In the private sector in 2010, 62 percent of women and 60
percent of men reported that their employer discouraged or prohibited the
sharing of wage information and that the violation can lead to punishment.148
In the public sector, only 18 percent of women and 11 percent of men report
that discussion of wage or salary information is discouraged or prohibited.149
Informed academics and practitioners assert that the NLRA protects the
right of covered workers to share information about wages and salary.150
How do we understand the disparity between the federal legal rule protecting
workers’ right to share pay information and the widely held belief that one
might get fired for doing so? While forbidding employee discussion about
pay may be illegal under the NLRA,151 this law is rarely enforced, the
penalties are de minimis, most workers do not know that the law might offer
protection, and they have no capacity to enforce whatever rights they might
have.152
Individual sharing of information and experience is a key first step, both
daunting and insufficient. Aggregated, transparent information is also
essential. In signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, the Obama
administration recognized that the statute of limitations was only one small
piece of the answer to the multiple problems of discriminatory pay.153 The
administration, after notice and comment, issued regulations requiring
employees with at least 100 workers to include aggregate, anonymous
information about pay for categories of employees on forms they already
submit with information on sex, race, and ethnicity.154 The Obama
regulations were very limited and only allowed access to researchers and
EEOC enforcers. In 2017, before the regulations went into effect, the Trump
administration suspended them without notice or comment.155
Congress has considered very modest proposals to address these issues.
The Paycheck Fairness Act, considered between 2013 and 2017, would have
prohibited employer retaliation against employee discussion of wages and
require the EEOC to collect compensation and employment data
disaggregated by sex, race, and national origin, available for research and

148. INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH, PAY SECRECY AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 1
fig.1 (2014).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency,
63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 392 (2011).
151. Employees who share information about salaries with coworkers are engaged in
“concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
152. Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 45–47 (2005); Estlund, supra note 150, at 388–89.
153. Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 1 PUB. PAPERS 22 (Jan.
29, 2009).
154. Bornstein, supra note 75, at 621–22; Kulow, supra note 74, at 418.
155. What You Should Know: Statement of Acting Chair Victoria A. Lipnic About OMB
Decision on EEO-1 Pay Data Collection, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/eeo1-pay-data.cfm [http://perma.cc/SG9K-Z6P3]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
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federal enforcement purposes but not to the public or individual workers.156
The proposed law was rejected by party-line votes.157
Information about wages is available for a large segment of workers,
including unionized workers, federal employees, state workers in a number
of states, and workers in some private enterprises.158 The evidence, while
complex and imperfect, shows that wage transparency reduces wage
disparity.159 For example, a large study by the U.S. General Accountability
Office published in 2009 showed that, between 1988 and 2017, under a
regime of wage transparency, the wage gap in the federal workforce
diminished from 28 cents to 11 cents on the dollar.160 While factors other
than wage transparency may explain part of the change, overall, the genderwage disparity is narrower in workplaces where wage information is readily
available.161
With the transformation of the federal courts, activists for civil rights and
equality—and the law schools that train them—need to become more adept
at seeking change at the state and local level. Even in an era when Congress
and the federal courts took primary responsibility for promoting civil rights
and equality, state law often provided concrete remedies and models for
federal change.162 Consider two well-known examples: abortion funding
and LGBTQ equality. First, with respect to abortion funding, in 1980, the
Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which excludes payment for abortion
from the otherwise comprehensive Medicaid program, which finances
healthcare for millions of low-income women,163 At the federal level, that
discriminatory rule has been extended to millions of others, including federal
employees, military personnel, federal prisoners, and residents of the District
of Columbia, and remains federal law today.164 Nonetheless, a majority of
U.S. women now live in states in which Medicaid covers abortion with state

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Kulow, supra note 74, at 420–23.
Id.
Id. at 422–27.
Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-279, WOMEN’S PAY: GENDER PAY
GAP IN THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE NARROWS AS DIFFERENCES IN OCCUPATION, EDUCATION,
AND EXPERIENCE DIMINISH 11 (2009).
161. See, e.g., Morten Bennedsen et al., Research: Gender Pay Gaps Shrink When
Companies Are Required to Disclose Them, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://hbr.org/
2019/01/research-gender-pay-gaps-shrink-when-companies-are-required-to-disclose-them
[https://perma.cc/R26G-4VYJ].
162. State constitutions and courts are often more protective of civil rights and equality,
but they are also often ignored. See generally STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (10th ed. 1993); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Susan Herman, Beyond
Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057 (1989); Helen Hershkoff,
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1131 (1999).
163. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
164. For discussion, see Rhonda Copelon & Sylvia A. Law, Nearly Allied to Her Right “to
Be”—Medicaid Funding for Abortion: The Story of Harris v. McRae, in WOMEN AND THE
LAW STORIES 207 (Elizabeth Schneider & Stephanie Wildman eds., 2011).
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funds.165 While some states did that through legislative action, in others,
state courts held that funding discrimination was prohibited by state
constitutions.166
LGBTQ equality provides a second example. In 1986, the Court in Bowers
v. Hardwick167 held that nothing in the federal constitution prevented
Georgia from criminally prosecuting adults who engaged in private,
consensual sexual activity with a person of the same sex.168 Over the next
decades, enormous popular movement persuaded localities, states, private
enterprises, and state courts interpreting state constitutions to reject
discrimination against LGBTQ people, including discriminatory exclusion
from marriage.169 The Court overruled Bowers in 2003170 and, in 2015,
recognized that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violates the
federal constitution.171 The state-level struggles for equality for poor women
seeking abortions and for liberty and equality for LGBTQ people provide
models for fights for gender pay equality.
States, cities, unions, and private employers are now considering new
approaches to address the gender pay gap: prohibitions on employer
questions about prior salaries, more effective prohibitions on punishment for
worker pay disclosure, broader promotion of pay transparency, and an
invigorated form of comparable worth.172
Gender pay equity proponents argue that, given the substantial evidence
of the persistent gender pay gap, employers should not be allowed to ask job
applicants about prior salaries and that to do so violates the existing Equal
Pay Act.173 In 2000, the EEOC instructed that reliance on salary history does
not, by itself, legally justify paying women less.174 Several federal courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, have rejected employers’ argument that basing
pay on salary history alone is a neutral “factor other than sex” justifying
paying women less and is lawful under the Equal Pay Act.175 Other federal
courts have disagreed and the Court recently remanded the Ninth Circuit case
165. See State Funding of Abortions Under Medicaid, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/abortion-under-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/6XVL-EBPQ].
166. See id.
167. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558 (2003).
168. Id. at 189.
169. For a discussion of these developments, see Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A.
Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 705
(2011).
170. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
171. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
172. See, e.g., Amanda Novello, States Are the New Proving Ground for Equal Pay
Policies, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/states-newproving-ground-equal-pay-policies [https://perma.cc/A66Q-KB7B].
173. See generally NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., ASKING FOR SALARY HISTORY
PERPETUATES PAY DISCRIMINATION FROM JOB TO JOB (2018).
174. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 10-IV(F)(2)(g) (2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html#g.%20Market%20Factors
[https://perma.cc/4ZNQ-6J8H].
175. See, e.g., Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, No. 18-272
(U.S. Feb. 25, 2019) (per curiam).
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because it held that a circuit judge who died before the en banc decision was
filed could not be counted in the en banc majority.176 Whatever the outcome
under federal law, the issue is being debated in states and localities. In 2016,
Massachusetts became the first state to prohibit employers from seeking
salary history from job applicants, and other cities, states, and counties across
the country have followed suit.177
As a second approach, some states and cities have adopted laws protecting
wage-disclosing employees from retaliation that are much stronger than the
ambiguous federal rule.178
Third, Minnesota, Massachusetts, several Canadian provinces, and several
European countries have required various forms of wage transparency.179
After the Massachusetts law went into effect in July 2018, Elizabeth Rowe,
a principal flutist of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, filed suit, complaining
that she earned $70,000 a year less than her colleague, principal oboist John
Ferrillo.180 Ferrillo supported her claim.181 Rowe and the Boston Symphony
Orchestra settled in February 2019, but court documents did not provide the
terms of the settlement.182
Finally, comparable pay is another potential response, now rejected at the
federal level. In response to the comparable worth movement of the 1980s,
many states adopted laws requiring that men and women be paid equally for
comparable work.183 But state courts often interpreted these statutes as
requiring no more than the federal Equal Pay Act.184 Since the Trump
election, legislators in forty states have considered proposals to strengthen
state protections to promote equal pay for comparable worth.185 Stephanie
Bornstein identifies three state laws in California, Massachusetts, and
Oregon as offering the strongest protections to remedy both gender and racial
pay gaps.186 These laws are just now going into effect, and it is too soon to
know whether they will be promote equal pay for comparable worth.
176. Yovino v. Rizo, No. 18-272, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2019) (per curiam).
177. See generally NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 173.
178. See, e.g., AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 29, at 20; Kulow, supra note 74, at
423–24.
179. Kulow, supra note 74, at 424; see also Alison Omens, Equal Pay for Women: Why
the U.S. Needs to Catch Up on Data Disclosure and Transparency, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2018,
10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/justcapital/2018/04/10/equal-pay-for-women-whythe-u-s-needs-to-catch-up-on-data-disclosure-and-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/T87YNHPQ].
180. Geoff Edgers, A Boston Symphony Orchestra Flutist Was Paid $70,000 Less Than a
Male Counterpart. She Sued, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.boston.com/news/
local-news/2018/12/11/boston-symphony-orchestra-flutist-elizabeth-rowe-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/W5YJ-8XJM].
181. Id.
182. Malcolm Gay, BSO Flutist Settles Equal-Pay Lawsuit with Orchestra, BOS. GLOBE
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/music/2019/02/14/bso-flutist-settlesequal-pay-lawsuit-with-orchestra/0iRyJCdjtu1BLWCAoqfQDL/story.html [https://perma.cc/
UG2G-UBPT].
183. Bornstein, supra note 75, at 610–15.
184. Id. Iowa is a notable exception. Id. at 611–12.
185. Id. at 629.
186. Id. at 623.
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The fourth, and perhaps the most likely to be most effective, response to
the gender pay disparity gap is not commanded by federal or state law but
rather voluntarily undertaken by unions and employers. It is recognizing the
value of paying people on the basis of performance and contribution and
acknowledging our common, often unconscious, history of racial and gender
discrimination. Unions have long conducted comparable pay studies and
have sometimes persuaded employers to implement them.187 Similarly,
some companies and private organizations have undertaken comparable
worth studies and adjusted pay accordingly.188
In 2016, the Obama administration announced a White House “Equal Pay
Pledge” for private sector companies committed to equal pay for their
employees. These companies committed to conducting annual gender pay
analyses across occupations, reviewing hiring and promotion processes and
procedures to reduce unconscious bias and structural barriers, and embedding
equal pay efforts into broader company initiatives.189 Simmons College now
hosts the Employers for Pay Equity Consortium. As of September 2018,
more than thirty-five companies had joined the consortium, including Delta
Airlines, Deloitte, Facebook, Gap Inc., General Motors, Johnson & Johnson,
Microsoft, PepsiCo, and Staples.190 The information revolution of the
twenty-first century allows workers to aggregate information online to
develop metrics of corporate responsibility, including wage fairness, and to
disseminate them broadly.191
We need a popular movement against wage inequality. Popular
movements often begin with individuals sharing experiences that were
previously secret. Think, for example, of the #MeToo and Time’s Up
movements; advocacy for reproductive justice, LGBTQ rights, and marriage
equality; and feminist and antiracism activism more generally. Sharing
individual experience is essential, but not alone sufficient for change.
Second, we then need systematic, aggregated, accessible information to
understand the nature and depth of the wage gap problems, both for women
and other historically disfavored groups. Third, we need stronger substantive
norms and remedies to enforce them. As a practical matter, these need to be
created by state and local governments, unions, and enlightened private
organizations. Global information allows us to learn from the examples of
others.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I want to share more stories particularly relevant to the
celebration of 100 years of women at Fordham Law School. In May 2018,
187. JANELLE JONES ET AL., WOMEN, WORKING FAMILIES, AND UNIONS 14–17 (2014).
188. Bornstein, supra note 75, at 622–24.
189. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 29, at 20.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., GLASSDOOR, http://www.glassdoor.com/index.htm [https://perma.cc/MP57HYNR] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); JUST CAP., http://justcapital.com [http://perma.cc/SF7D4BB4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
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the University of Denver agreed to pay $2.66 million to compensate the
women faculty of the Sturm College of Law for the gap between their pay
and that of male colleagues doing equal work since 1973.192 The Law School
has a “boldly progressive reputation”193 and has long been home to leading
feminist scholars.194 The Law School agreed to a six-year monitoring
plan.195 A highly reliable source told me of another recent, similarly
dramatic settlement at a second U.S. law school. It included a confidentiality
agreement prohibiting those involved from discussing the case, and so I am
not able to share the details. While it is impossible to know, I believe that
the pattern revealed in these two schools is the norm, not the exception, in
private law schools.
My hope is that, in this conference, we can make change by talking with
one another and our male colleagues, demanding transparency in our own
institutions, and, if problems are revealed, achieving change. More
importantly, legal scholars and educators have a special ability, and perhaps
responsibility, to take on the challenge of addressing the issues of illegal and
unjust gender and race wage disparities in less rarified workplaces, where the
money matters even more to those on the short end of the stick. Finally, and
most ambitiously, my dream is that by focusing on these issues in the
relatively simple context of gender pay disparity, we can begin to address the
larger issues of the vast and growing disparity of income, wealth, and
opportunity in the United States.
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